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In this paper we explore the impact of the economic recession of 2008 
on gender inequality in the labor force in Central and Eastern European 
countries. We argue that job and occupational segregation protected women’s 
employment more than men's in the CEE region as well, but unlike in more 
developed capitalist economies, women’s level of labor force participation 
declined and their rates of poverty increased during the crisis years. We also 
explore gender differences in opinions on the impact of the recession on 
people’s job satisfaction. For our analysis we use published data from 
EUROSTAT and our own calculations from EU SILC and ESS 2010.
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The Great Recession of 2008 was the second major economic 
downturn which has devastated the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) in the past quarter of a century. The first one 
after the fall of the communist regimes forced economic insecurity 
on a sizeable portion of the population. The second has exposed 
even more vulnerabilities, more cutbacks in social spending, a rise 
in joblessness and substantial deprivation. But the harsh conse-
quences of the two crises have not been distributed equally: 
class and race inequalities have increased in each post-state socia-
list society, especially immediately after 1990 and then again since 
the beginning of the Great Recession.
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In this paper we examine the differential impact of the eco-
nomic crisis on the working lives of men and women in the post-
socialist “periphery” of the European Union. Feminist observers 
had expected gender inequalities to rise sharply after 1990. Indeed, 
women’s employment chances did deteriorate, while their risk of 
joblessness and poverty did multiply. However, there is little docu-
mented evidence available for a systematic increase in overall 
gender inequalities in the labor markets of post-socialist societies. 
Did this change after the Great Recession of 2008? Did the eco-
nomic crisis have specifically gendered consequences in Central 
and Eastern Europe? Researchers have found a leveling down 
process when examining the European Union overall: while the 
position of women has remained more or less stable, men have lost 
jobs at a higher rate, so the gender gap has narrowed (Bettio et al., 
2012). After a careful examination of the data we argue that a diffe-
rent picture emerges in CEE countries: here women also lost 
ground economically, if not to the same extent as men. This means 
that while the gender gap narrowed in Central and Eastern Europe 
as well, the difference between the employment and poverty rates 
of women in core and peripheral societies increased. The crisis has 
thus led to a diversification in women’s life experiences. There has 
been a divergence between the more and less developed parts 
of the continent – at least among women. This is indeed a form of 
inequality, namely inequality among women, even if this is less 
than inequality between women and men.
In addition, we test the hypotheses developed to explain the 
impact of economic crises on gender relations and we find support 
for the existence of a “silver lining” in job segregation: i.e. the fact 
that job segregation may provide protection for women in 
economic downturn. We find this to be valid in CEE countries, 
perhaps even more so than elsewhere. But other factors are also at 
play. Job segregation itself does not fully explain the variation 
across countries in how women have been affected. Other factors 
such as welfare measures, parental leave practices as well as the 
structure of the labor market are also important. This assumption 
fully coincides with Rubery’s and Rafferty’s recent statement that 
“… the gendered impact of a recession will not be the same across 
time and space as differences can be expected in women’s relative 
position in the labor market or welfare system linked to varying 
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degrees of attachment to employment and varying social norms 
and household arrangements.” (Rubery and Rafferty, 2013:2). 
Finally, we explore the gendered differences in people’s experience 
of the crisis and show that men have tended to suffer cutbacks and 
vulnerabilities more than women in both parts of the continent.
In the next section of this chapter we consider the reasons why 
CEE countries may exhibit different trends in gender inequality, 
compared to more developed regions of the European Union. Then 
we proceed to put forward our argument in three sections, addres-
sing: i) the gender differences in job losses and destitution in 
the CEE, as compared to “Western” Europe1; ii) the impact of job 
segregation as well as other possible factors which may explain 
variations within CEE; and iii) gender and regional differences in 
people’s experience of the crisis. We conclude with a discussion of 
our findings and some suggestions for further analysis.
1. Why the CEE countries?
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe exhibit patterns 
which are different in a number of ways to those observed in histo-
rically capitalist societies. These include: i) women’s participation 
in paid work, ii) in mainstream ideological commitments to gender 
equality, and iii) the practices and consequences of mothering on 
women’s participation in public life. There are at least two broad 
reasons for these differences. On the one hand, the legacy of state 
socialism is still an important factor shaping certain social 
processes in these countries, gender relations being an important 
example. This legacy is not uniform: state socialist societies were 
quite different even before 1990. However, they did share a 
commitment to women’s emancipation in a rather narrow sense 
and started promoting this idea well before women started to enter 
the labor market in developed capitalist countries. The main pillar 
of the emancipation campaign was women’s full employment, a 
response to the permanent and urgent demand for cheap labor 
1. We use the term “Western” Europe, and the “West” with a capital “W”, or in quotation 
marks to indicate that we do not simply mean a geographical location but rather a concept, i.e. 
the “core” or more developed countries within the European Union. This also suggests that we 
are aware of the value connotations associated with the concept of the “West” and invoked in 
both parts of the continent when discussing geopolitical divides. For further explanations see 
Melegh, 2006.
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in the socialist economy. In the 1960s, however, a pattern of 
lengthy parental leave was introduced, which is still part of legis-
lation in many CEE countries. Full-time employment and long 
parental leaves made the work-life balance feasible and the social 
norm for most women across the region. This history is thus 
meaningful for at least the current generation of women.
Secondly, the post-socialist region has been partially integrated 
into the European Union but even countries, which are members 
of the EU, operate on the peripheries of the European geopolitical 
space. This peripheral status has a direct impact on all areas of life 
including the economy, the labor market, the structure of social 
inequalities, etc. It has important consequences for gender 
relations too, as studies on migration, on women’s work in multi-
national factories, and on welfare state retrenchment have 
demonstrated. These two factors – the history of state socialism 
and life in the peripheries of an economic system – shape the expe-
rience of everyday life for the populations of these countries and 
impacts gender relations in meaningful ways. Below we review the 
legacy of state socialism briefly, and later show how the peripheral 
position of the CEE countries is being reinforced through subtly-
changing gender inequalities brought on by the economic crisis 
of 2008.
2. State socialism and its collapse
As early as the 1940s, state socialist policy-makers introduced a 
vast array of social policies which were supposed to bring gender 
equality and women’s emancipation to CEE countries in the not-
so-distant future. These policies encouraged and occasionally 
forced women to enter the labor market and participate in public 
life (Haney 2002; Kligman 1992; Weiner 2007). Indeed, by the 
early 1980s, most women expected to spend their lives in paid 
work, working full time, throughout their adult lives, perhaps 
interspersed with short breaks for raising children. Inequalities in- 
and outside the labor market remained, but women’s full time 
participation in wage-labor increased until 1989. Their contri-
butions to family budgets soon became significant, and by the 
1980s their chances of making it at least into middle level mana-
gerial positions exceeded that of women living in comparable non-
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socialist countries. Mainstream official gender ideology promoted 
the importance of women’s contributions to economic growth and 
political life, while simultaneously also constructing women as 
mothers and carers of children and the elderly (Fodor 2002). 
Lengthy parental leaves were introduced in the late 1960s in most 
of the CEE countries, and women indeed withdrew from the labor 
force for long periods after childbirth. This, however, was less 
“costly” in a state socialist economy which was characterized by a 
shortage of labor rather than unemployment. Even if returning 
after 5 years on parental leave, women with small children could 
easily find work before 1989.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall much of this has changed. From 
the point of view of the research here, a steep decline in employ-
ment levels is the most important issue (Einhorn 1993, Funk and 
Mueller 1993, Gal and Kligman 2000). Figure 1 below demons-
trates these trends in eight post-socialist societies: a sharp drop in 
employment between 1990 and the mid-1990s was followed by 
varying degrees of growth in most countries.2 The figure below also 
reveals profound differences among countries. Hungary performed 
worst with a vast drop in employment and very little improvement 
since, while the decline was smaller and gains came faster, for 
example, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, or Slovenia. 
Scharle has pointed out three basic reasons for the low employ-
ment level of both men and women after 1990, in all post-socialist 
countries: “the compressed wage structure of the pre-transition era, 
the transitional shock, and the policy response to the shock” 
(Scharle, 2012: 180). She has also emphasised that the rapid priva-
tization process in Estonia, Hungary and Latvia contributed to the 
huge and permanent loss in employment (see Figure 1 above). 
The process of privatization and thus the shift to a market prin-
ciple was slower or timed differently in the other countries, which 
2. All through the paper we explore employment rather than unemployment rates. We made 
this choice as most statistics are based on self-classification and we expect women to classify 
themselves as “homemakers” rather than “unemployed” when this choice is possible, while 
men will most likely opt to do the opposite. Therefore, unemployment rates themselves reflect a 
gendered understanding of social expectations, which we avoid when we study employment 
rates only. Moreover, instead of unemployment, inactivity has always been a serious and 
widespread phenomenon in most post socialist countries. This has several reasons, from the 
high female enrollment rate in higher education to the trap of lengthy parental leave schemes, 
as discussed below.
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may explain some of the differences in the rate of job loss. 
The three countries noted above could not recover before the 2008 
crisis started. According to Scharle, the low employment level was 
maintained by the high percentage of unskilled people in all post-
socialist countries.
One of the consequences of the disappearance of jobs was the 
emergence of extreme destitution and deprivation. Statistics on 
poverty and social inequality are hard to find and notoriously 
unreliable for the state socialist period. However, all observers 
agree that the rate of poverty increased, with certain groups being 
particularly affected: especially those who belong to under-
privileged ethnic minorities, who have low levels of education, 
and/or who live in rural regions (Emigh and Szelenyi, 2001). 
The threat of permanent hopeless poverty has had consequences 
not only for people’s own health and life chances but also for 
society, the social fabric, solidarity at large.
Researchers generally assumed that women would be dispro-
portionately disadvantaged by the economic crisis that followed 
the collapse of the state socialist economic and social systems 
(Einhorn, 1993; Funk and Mueller, 1993). Feminist authors iden-
tified a “back-to-the-kitchen” type of revival of domesticity, 
growing discrimination against women, a decline in the provision 
of social services, including childcare facilities, and an increase in 
the time employers expected workers to spend on the job. On the 
basis of these, many scholars expected an overwhelming increase 
Figure 1. Level of employment in accession countries
1989=100
Sources: for 1989-1995: ILO (2011) ; for 1996-2007: Eurostat on-line database (LFS employment, population aged 
15-64 ; Scharle, 2012: 184.
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in labor market gender inequality: women were seen as the ulti-
mate losers of the transforming economies.
Yet overall, women did not seem to have lost more ground in 
the paid labor force than men. For example, Fodor (1997) found 
that in at least some of the Central European countries gender was 
not a significant predictor of unemployment, net of other factors. 
She argued that skills which had been more typical of women 
protected them in these countries, including: language skills, high 
school education as opposed to specialized vocational training, as 
well as experience in service sectors jobs which had been devalued, 
poorly paid and thus feminized under socialism. But these skills 
subsequently became more useful in a service-oriented, globalizing 
economy. Glass (2008) reproduced these results using somewhat 
different indicators, and argued that not gender alone but parental 
status became a major disadvantage in the labor market especially 
for women. Lippe and Fodor (1998) reviewing a broader range of 
labor market indicators – such as the wage gap, job segregation, 
and access to authority – showed little increase in gender ine-
quality in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The labor market situation of women no doubt worsened after 
1989 (Matland and Montgomery, 2003; Pascall and Kwak, 2005; 
Weiner, 2007). Many women were forced to leave the labor force, 
although, unlike men, instead of being unemployed they often 
went on parental leave or into early retirement at least in the coun-
tries where this option was available.3 Examining this period, 
researchers noted the paradoxical situation where fewer and fewer 
children were born (in Hungary, for example) yet more and more 
women stayed on child-related leave, as new types of entitlements 
were also introduced (Frey, 1997). The rate of poverty among 
women and especially single mothers and female single pensioners 
increased. The real value of a number of social welfare payments 
decreased while most CEE countries experienced some forms of 
“re-familization” of care, exactly at the same time when the oppo-
site tendency was taking hold in the “West” (Saxonberg-Sirovatka, 
2006). Time budget surveys underline the existence of high levels 
of inequalities in the domestic division of labor (Bukodi; 2005, 
3. Even in the early years following change of the system the official retirement age threshold 
was quite low in many post-socialist countries: 55 years for women and 60 years for men.
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Falussy, 2002). The already-existing trend that women with small 
children withdrew from the labor force for lengthy periods of time 
in some CEE countries, such as Hungary, Poland, Slovakia or the 
Czech Republic intensified and was also supported by the emer-
gence of rather conservative gender role attitudes (Křížková et al., 
2010). Some authors also called attention to the backlash due to 
what was seen as an “unholy alliance” between women and the 
state (Gal and Kligman, 2000), referring to the argument that the 
socialist state provided more undeserved blanket support for 
women than for men. Yet, while women suffered great losses 
during the transition from state socialism, so did men and 
gender inequality may not have increased systematically or to the 
extent expected. 
This should not have come as a surprise. Historical research had 
long pointed out that the deeply entrenched practice and ideology 
of job segregation may protect women from becoming the “reserve 
army of labor” in certain types of economic crises, for example, in 
the Great Depression (Milkman, 1976; Rubery, 1988). This was so, 
because women occupied positions in segments of the economy, 
such as the service sector, which were less effected by the crisis. 
Also, they tended to do jobs, for example in accounting, human 
resource management, secretarial help, teaching, etc., which were 
indispensable even for crisis-effected industries. This may not be 
the case in every economic crisis as contexts vary: for example, 
when women’s employment is concentrated in export-oriented 
production and when the crisis affects investment in this area, 
women are the first to lose their jobs (Seguino, 2000; Razavi, 
Pearson and Danloy, 2004). In addition, crises often mean auste-
rity measures and a change in the care economy, which may 
impact a family’s survival strategy and could mean a heavier 
domestic work load for women (EWL, 2012). 
But job segregation did, to some extent, protect women’s labor 
market position after the fall of state socialism. In 1990, although 
manufacturing jobs contracted this was accompanied by a veri-
table boom in the service industries, for example in banking, 
finance, hotels and tourism, etc. People with skills associated with 
these occupations (language skills, administrative experience, 
“people skills”, etc.) were in demand, while those with more tech-
nically oriented knowledge lost their attractiveness to employers. 
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Women were more likely than men to have gained these skills 
under state socialism. In addition, women had accumulated work 
experience in the public sector (for example, in education, health 
care or public administration), which gave them more protection 
than private enterprises. As discussed by Rubery, although a rela-
tively higher proportion of professional positions had been 
available to women in health care and education in the Central 
and Eastern European countries than in the Western world, these 
jobs had also been particularly badly paid there. This means that 
women in public service occupations in general received very low 
pay in the “Eastern bloc” (Rubery, 2013). Obviously, the 
segmented labor market both protected and limited women in 
their careers and the metaphors of the “glass wall” and the “glass 
ceiling” have been applicable in the CEE context as well (Nagy, 
2012). It should also be noted that certain groups of women, such 
as mothers with small children, ethnic minorities or older women 
did find themselves at a particular disadvantage in the 1990s, once 
the protection offered by socialist states was removed and discri-
mination became widespread (Glass, 2008). 
3. The crisis of 2008 
The first economic crisis in 1990 in the region had severe conse-
quences for both men and women, but as most of the CEE 
countries started to recover from the shock of the collapse of state 
socialism, a new recession hit their labor markets. In the remaining 
part of this section we examine the impact of this second crisis 
while bearing in mind comparisons to the previous one.
Researchers have proposed three major hypotheses about 
women’s relative (dis)advantage in times of economic downturn 
(Milkman, 1976; Rubery, 1988; EP, 2011). Some scholars expect 
women to be especially badly affected: women are assumed to be 
the first to be dismissed and the last to be rehired in case of a shor-
tage of employment, as women’s labor market position is very 
vulnerable. The phenomenon is often labeled as the “buffer” hypo-
thesis (Rubery, 1988), or the marginality effect (EP, 2011), or 
women are even positioned as a “reserve army of labor” (Milkman 
1976). Women are viewed as marginal in the labor market, less 
senior than men in most cases, their income is not considered vital 
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for the family budget and thus they are seen as expendable, a true 
“reserve army of labor”. Alternatively, other commentators suggest 
that women may not be especially vulnerable in times of economic 
crisis as they are protected by the existence of job segregation 
(segmentation hypothesis). This is the “silver lining” of job segre-
gation, which nevertheless is the main reason behind the wage / 
pension gaps and much gender inequality observed otherwise. Yet 
if women occupy positions which are less severely affected in a 
shrinking labor market, they will do better than men and 
employers will keep employing women rather than switching to 
hiring men, especially when women are cheaper, and seen as more 
docile employees. This is called the “substitution hypothesis” 
(Rubery, 1988), or the strength-in-weakness effect (EP, 2011). 
Below we examine the data on CEE countries in the light of these 
three approaches.
Indeed, the first reports on the economic crisis of 2008 
(the largest since the Great Depression of 1929) support the appli-
cability of the segmentation hypothesis, at least within 
the European Union and for the USA.4 Bettio et al. (2012) note that 
gender inequality in the EU has declined after 2008 (see also UN 
Women, 2013). They add, however, that “[t]there has been a leve-
ling down of gender gaps in employment, unemployment, wages 
and poverty over the crisis. This however does not reflect progress 
in gender equality as it is based on lower rates of employment, 
higher rates of unemployment and reduced earnings for both men 
and women.” (Bettio et al., 2012: 8). The explanation for this may 
again be found in job segregation: in countries where segregation 
is stronger, women’s disadvantage compared to men is smaller. 
Does this apply for CEE countries too and if so, is there any varia-
tion among them? Below we use data from EUROSTAT as well as 
EU SILC 2008 and 2010, and the European Social Survey 2010 to 
describe the gender impact of the economic crisis on employment, 
poverty and its perception in CEE countries. 
4. The designation of the present crisis as “mancession” was widely used in the US in 2009. 
See Baxter, 2009; Wall, 2009; The Economist, 2009. It described the situation that the recession 
first affected the male labor force.
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4. Leveling down or the stranding of all boats?
European Union statistical data show that East European men 
have been the main losers of the 2008 crisis: major job losses 
occurred in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, where men’s employ-
ment rate dropped from around 75% to 64% (EC, 2012). In other 
CEE countries too, women were less likely to lose their employ-
ment than men (see the tables in the Appendix.) In this sense their 
experience of the economic crisis is not altogether different from 
women in more developed countries: gender inequality declined 
because men lost out more than women. But, unlike in most other 
EU countries, women in peripheral parts of the continent suffered 
greatly from the recession. Women’s joblessness, poverty and 
material deprivation rates increased in all of the ten post-socialist 
EU member states.
Figure 2a above displays employment rates for women before 
and during the crisis years in core EU countries, in CEE countries 
and in the other peripheral countries of the EU (Spain, Ireland, 
Greece, Cyprus and Portugal).5 In core countries, women’s employ-
ment rate barely declined: it stood at 66.1% in 2007 and grew to 
67.7% by 2012, never dropping below the 2007 level. This 
contrasts to men’s job losses, but that was not specifically marked 
either. Men’s employment rate (see Figure 2b) was 79.6% in 2007, 
but only 78% in 2012, with a 77.8% low in 2011.
The story is quite different in other regions of the EU. Women’s 
employment rate declined steadily until 2010-11 and started to 
pick up a bit afterwards, but has not reached its pre-crisis levels by 
2012. In 2008, women’s average employment rate was about 64% 
in Central and Eastern Europe, which dropped to 61% by 2011. 
Men’s job losses were more severe: employment rates declined 
from over 76% in 2008 to 70% by 2010, with an increase starting 
in 2011, especially in the Baltic countries. No doubt, men suffered 
more job loss than women everywhere, but the contrast between 
women’s experiences in “core” and “peripheral” countries is also 
pronounced. This is so especially if we examine the case of the 
“Southern” periphery of the EU separately. There the impact of the 
5. In terms of women’s employment patterns and the huge employment losses, Ireland 
belongs more to the group of the “Southern” periphery than the core countries.
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crisis has been especially heavily felt by both women and men: 
women’s employment rate had declined by almost 5 percentage 
points by 2012, while men’s dropped from over 80% to 69%: i.e., 
an 11 percentage point decrease. 
Figure 2a. Women’s employment rates from 2007 to 2012 
in three groups of countries
Figure 2b. Men’s employment rates from 2007 to 2012 
in three groups of countries
Source: EUROSTAT.
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Both women and men in CEE countries suffered job loss, 
although men have borne more of the burden of the crisis than 
men in the core countries. In addition, the peripheral regions expe-
rienced more hardship than core countries, even though 
employment rates were already lower in the former, in 2007. 
Women’s disadvantage in CEE countries declined somewhat 
compared to men, but the gap between their life chances and those 
of their counterparts in “Western” Europe grew wider. This is 
probably the most important point here: inequalities among 
women in core and peripheral countries are on the rise. This may 
have long term consequences for migration patterns, as women in 
poorer countries migrate to do care work in more developed 
regions – a phenomenon which can only exist if inequalities are 
large enough (Milkman, Reese and Roth, 1998; Bettio et al., 2012). 
Indeed, recent Eurostat data on migration supports this claim.6
A growing number of migrants left CEE countries for the Western 
part of Europe – out-migration is the lowest in Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia and Hungary. However, both the target coun-
tries and the gender ratios were different across nations. 
For example, as is well known about 1.8 million Polish people 
migrated to European countries, particularly to the UK shortly 
after the EU accession. Although the process has slowed down, it is 
significant even today. Women and men from Romania and 
Bulgaria targeted mainly Germany and Spain to work in agricul-
ture, whereas mainly women are welcome to work in household 
and in care work in Italy. The Baltic States made use of their close-
ness to the Nordic countries. Overall there has been a slight female 
surplus leaving for Western countries (though in the case of 
Norway, which is not an EU member, more men than women left 
the CEE countries). In sum, migration serves as a buffer in the 
depressed labor markets of CEE countries, but there is no evidence 
that this affected women or men more, as there is demand for low-
skilled workers of both genders in West Europe.
Similar patterns may be observed when we look at rates of 
poverty and especially material deprivation (see Figure 3). 
6. We are grateful for Attila Melegh, who provided the Eurostat flow and stock migration data. 
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People who are classified as materially deprived live in extreme 
poverty and lack access to basic goods and resources. Overall, this 
type of poverty is significantly lower in “Western” Europe than in 
CEE countries or in the “Southern periphery”, and this gap has 
increased further during the recent crisis. In 2007 a little less than 
10% of people in core countries lived in material deprivation accor-
ding to EU surveys, as did 32% in CEE countries and about 20% in 
the “South”. But while in core countries neither women nor men 
were much more likely to end up in extreme poverty after the crisis, 
in Central and Eastern Europe both men and women have faced a 
higher chance of experiencing severe deprivation. Women’s rate of 
material deprivation grew from 32% to 34.5% in CEE countries and 
from 20% to 22.8% in the South. Thus while in the “West” resear-
chers characterize the experience of the crisis as one of “leveling 
down”: i.e. gender gaps have diminished due to a weakening of 
men’s position while women’s social status stagnated, in the CEE 
countries both men and women suffered (and keep suffering) 
losses, even if men do so slightly more than women. This is not 
simply a leveling down, where one person’s position sinks to that of 
a lower group, it is a situation when everyone is experiencing a 
harder time and the gap between the different parts of the conti-
Figure 3. Rates of material deprivation: differences across regions and genders
Source: Eurostat, online, accessed March 1, 2013.
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nent, especially between the job market opportunities of women 
in core and peripheral countries has widened. In CEE countries, 
financial cuts in the public sector have affected women’s economic 
situation especially. As Rubery has put it: “This has led to a large rise 
in low paid public sector workers – for example in Hungary and 
Romania – many of whom are women. In the Baltic States the high 
share of performance pay facilitated widespread reductions in 
nominal pay that significantly reduced the pay premium in Latvia 
and Lithuania.” (Rubery, 2013: 34).
Since in the first economic crisis in the early 1990s the most 
important losers were women with children, who were the most 
likely to lose paid employment. We examined how this group 
fared in the second economic downturn in the region. Researchers 
have found that in CEE countries with generous parental leave 
policies, women withdraw from the labor market for lengthy 
periods and have difficulty returning. In these countries, mothe-
rhood especially of young children has had a high impact on 
female employment (EC, 2012). Interestingly, however, in 2008 
women with children did not do worse than those without, either 
in the CEE countries or in “Western” Europe. Using the 2008 and 
2010 waves of the EU SILC database, we calculated self-declared 
employment rates for these two groups of women and found that 
the same patterns hold in both groups: women with children were 
not particularly disadvantaged in this case either in the “East” or 
the “West”.7 This is notable, as it is sharply different from what we 
found in the 1990 crisis. On average, fewer mothers of small 
children are in the labor market in CEE countries than in 
“Western” Europe, although those who are tend to work full time. 
This pattern forces women in CEE countries to choose either 
between a life oriented more towards mothering, or to following 
the full-time (male) worker model, as moving between the two is 
difficult and costly. This is certainly one of the reasons for labor 
market gender inequality in CEE countries, but we observed no 
change in this pattern. This may be because women with young 
children had already been excluded and discouraged from the 
labor market well before the present crisis. The employment of 
7. In this case respondents were asked to classify themselves as to what their economic status 
is (variable PL030, EU SILC 2010).
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these women had already reached its lowest point earlier, due to 
the lack of opportunity for returning to employment, insufficient 
childcare facilities, a dysfunctional parental leave system, etc. 
5. Variations in the degree and distribution of job losses 
across CEE countries
While the overall pattern is no doubt interesting, a more 
nuanced picture emerges from an examination of the differences 
across countries in employment losses. In the this section we will 
focus more on the CEE region, and look at country-specific varia-
tions and their causes. Figure 4 describes the difference between 
the peak employment rate (in most cases in 2008) and the lowest 
rate (usually 2010) in each CEE country, separately for women and 
men. The average difference in the employment rate between the 
peak and the trough year is 3.6 percentage points for women and 
7.3 percentage points for men. As noted above, men in the Baltic 
countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) suffered the most from 
job loss within the EU. In Estonia and Latvia, men’s employment 
rates were 13-15 percentage points lower in the depth of the crisis, 
compared to more prosperous times just two years earlier. Bulgaria 
is close to the Baltic group with a roughly 10 percentage point loss 
for men, while there is practically no change in men’s employment 
level in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. Women’s rates 
roughly follow men’s: women in the Baltic States, where they 
experienced the most loss, followed by Bulgaria, then Slovakia and 
Slovenia. It should be noted that Romania is the only country 
according to Eurostat data where women’s job losses were greater 
than men’s. 
Recovery has started after the trough years in most CEE coun-
tries. Figure 5 describes gains in the employment rate for men and 
women, compared to the lowest employment levels. On average, 
men’s employment rate has climbed by 2.3 percentage points, and 
women’s by 1.25 percentage points. This means that by 2012, the 
gender gap was still narrower than it was in 2008, but somewhat 
larger than in the trough year in between. This is so because men’s 
employment losses were worse and while these are improving 
more rapidly than women’s, by 2012 the difference had not 
reached its pre-recession level. 
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It should be noted that in the Baltic countries, men’s employ-
ment gains have been significantly higher than women’s: men 
seem to be in a better position to recover from the crisis. This is in 
fact true for most of the countries, except the Czech Republic, 
where women have recovered faster. In Bulgaria, where job 
losses were significant, almost no improvement has started yet. 
Figure 4. The difference between the highest and lowest employment rates 
between 2008 and 2012, aged 15-64
Percentage points
Figure 5. Recovery and improvement in employment rates between 
the trough year and 2012, for women and men
Percentage points
Source: EUROSTAT, accessed April 29, 2013.
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This suggests that the crisis is far from over in CEE countries. While 
the gender gap may have narrowed, men seem to recover faster 
and gain some of their jobs back. The gap between core and peri-
pheral countries in terms of employment rates (or in the level of 
poverty and extreme poverty) has widened.
What might explain the cross-country variation in women’s 
ability to retain employment in times of economic crisis? We turn 
to an examination of this question in the next section.
6. Explaining cross-country differences
There are a number of reasons why women may do worse in 
some countries than in others. Bettio et al. (2012) have found that 
the job segregation argument (described above) is applicable to the 
recent Great Recession as well. Specifically, they show that there is 
a positive correlation between the level of job segregation and the 
gender gap in employment losses: gender differences were larger 
(i.e., women fared better relative to men) in countries where occu-
pational and sectoral segregation were more pronounced. Bettio 
et al. (2012) calculated a correlation coefficient of 0.50 for the rela-
tionship between sectoral segregation and the gender gap in 
employment loss for 2009. We made the same calculations for the 
CEE countries alone. Table 1 below summarizes the strength of 
the relationship between occupational/sectoral segregation, and 
gender differences in employment rate changes.
The correlation between sectoral segregation and the employ-
ment loss gap is 0.71 in CEE countries, much higher than what 
Bettio et al. found for the whole of the EU (0.5). This means that 
the relationship between sectoral segregation and men’s employ-
ment disadvantage is higher in CEE than in Western European 
countries. The same is true for occupational segregation where 
Table 1. Correlation coefficients between different types of segregation 
and the male-female employment gap in two periods in CEE countries
Peak to trough 
period
Trough to 2012 
period
Occupational segregation and employment gap 0.60 0.40
Sectoral segregation and the employment gap 0.71 0.67
Source: Fazekas and Scharle, 2012.
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Bettio’s coefficient of 0.40 contrasts to ours of 0.60. We also calcu-
lated correlation coefficients for the relationship between sectoral 
segregation and gender difference in employment rate recovery 
(thus for the years between the trough and 2012), and found that 
these are somewhat weaker relationships than those in the earlier 
period, in the CEE countries as well.
Figure 6 describes the strong relationship between the level of 
sectoral segregation and the gender gap in job losses. The vertical 
axis describes the gender gap in job losses – the percentage point 
difference between men’s job losses and women’s. The horizontal 
axis is a segregation index calculated for EU countries from Bettio 
et al. (2012). We note a strong correlation between the two 
variables: at higher rates of segregation, men’s job losses are higher 
relative to those of women. But this figure also indicates that a 
linear regression line (or correlation coefficient) does not tell the 
whole story. Indeed, we observe a group that is quite different from 
the rest, namely the small Baltic States.
Figure 6. Scatter plot showing the relationship between sectoral segregation and 
the gender gap in job loss (peak to trough period)
Source: Bettio et al. 2012.
Éva Fodor and Beáta Nagy140
In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, high levels of sectoral segrega-
tion go hand in hand with major job losses for all: relatively less for 
women, and a huge drop for men (EC, 2012: 31). These countries 
suffered the greatest decline in GDP during the crisis years among 
CEEs: more than twice as much as observed in Romania, the Czech 
Republic or Hungary, which were also deeply affected (IMF 
website).8 Much of the decline was due to a sudden halt in foreign 
direct investment. This was experienced in other countries as well, 
but had a more dramatic impact in states which had relied heavily 
on foreign investment for their economic growth. In 2007, foreign 
direct investment stock amounted to over 70% of the GDP of 
Estonia. The flow of foreign capital into the country dropped to 
about half, from over 13% to about 7% of the GDP by 2009, drop-
ping to less than 2% in 2011.9 This occurred as GDP itself was in 
sharp decline. Foreign investment in Estonia created jobs for both 
men and women, albeit in different sectors. The sectors which 
contracted most sharply were manufacturing and construction, 
typically male-dominated fields, and this may explain some of the 
disadvantages men suffered after 2007. Similarly, as FDI invest-
ments bottomed out by 2009, Latvia and Lithuania (as well as 
Bulgaria, which is also heavily dependent on foreign capital) expe-
rienced severe labor market contractions, especially in sectors 
dominated by men. By 2012, however, the male employment rate 
had increased sharply in the three Baltic countries (but not in 
Bulgaria). Analysts celebrate the Baltic region’s flexibility and 
“unique adjustment” in reacting to the financial shock (Purfield-
Rosenberg, 2010), and emphasize that foreign investors, parti-
cularly parent banks, did not withdraw from these countries. 
This protected some female-dominated jobs during the crisis, and 
also helped the recovery. At the other end of the spectrum, 
women’s advantage compared to men was much smaller in 
Romania or Slovenia. These countries have the least segregated 
labor markets, which did not protect women in times of an 
economic downturn, as evidenced by this data.
8. A summary of the Baltic States’ financial crises can be found on the IMF-blog: http://blog-
imfdirect.imf.org/2011/01/07/toughing-it-out-how-the-baltics-defied-predictions/ . 
9. Eurostat,http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgmrefreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&p
code=tec00046&language=en, accessed April 2, 2013.
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Segregation does not explain the whole story, however, and 
here we can only put forward to an exception to demonstrate this 
point. Slovakia is an interesting contrast to the Baltic States: 
its level of sectoral segregation is similarly high, yet women’s 
advantage in the crisis was much smaller in this country, compa-
rable to that of other CEE nations. Slovakia was also heavily 
impacted by the contraction of FDI investment flows, which 
dropped to zero by 2009 (from over 8% of GDP in 2006), but a 
different structure of investments may explain why women here 
were less protected. This suggests that sectoral segregation will 
have different consequences depending on the existing structure 
of the economy, which may be quite different. 
7. Gender differences in the perceptions of the impact of 
the crisis
Previous analysis has pointed out men’s subjective vulnerability 
in times of crises. “Men do report themselves as more affected by 
the crisis with more frequent complaints of heightened job insecu-
rity, cuts in pay and having to accept less interesting work” (Bettio 
et al., 2012 based on ESS 2010). This paper also presents the 
perceived differences not only between men and women, but also 
between the two parts of the European continent. We expect men 
in “Western” countries to complain more intensively about “softer 
issues”, such as less interesting work. In contrast, we expect men in 
“Eastern” countries, where the decrease of employment started 
from a lower level, to stress “harder issues”, such as reductions in 
pay and less job security.
Based on previous results, we expect men to express deeper 
dissatisfaction for at least two reasons. On the one hand, their 
employment figures decreased more considerably, which is an 
objective explanation for the more intensive complaints. On the 
other, we assume that according to the prevailing gender order, 
men are expected to be more attached to paid work even today 
than women. Thus work-related losses might cause higher rates in 
perceptions in general. This expectation may go back to the old 
sex-segregated models, which treat men’s and women’s commit-
ment to employment differently, with a bias towards men. 
As Feldberg and Glenn emphasised in their classical work “[w]hile 
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analyses of men's relationship to employment concentrate on job-
related features, most analyses of women's relationship to employ-
ment (which are rare by comparison) virtually ignore type of job 
and working conditions. When it is studied at all, women's rela-
tionship to employment is treated as derivative of personal 
characteristics and relationships to family situations.” (Feldberg-
Glenn, 1976: 526). Despite the time which has passed since this 
publication, sociological investigations repeatedly show evidence 
of these traditional and stereotypical gender expectations. (A good 
overview about the mechanisms is given by Ridgeway and 
Connell, 2004). This is particularly challenging in the CEE coun-
tries, where re-familization took place in the post-socialist era, 
as noted above. Thus, we presume that men in CEE countries will 
perceive the highest loss concerning paid employment.
The European Social Survey (ESS) 2010 contained four basic 
questions for measuring the perceptions of the economic crisis. 
The questions referred to the previous three years, thus the respon-
dents were asked to compare the years before (2007) and after the 
crisis (2010). The questions were formulated in the following way: 
“Please tell me whether or not each of the following has happened 
to you in the last three years: I have had to do less interesting 
work? I have had to take a reduction in pay? I have had to work 
shorter hours? I have had less security in my job?”
The most frequent problem interviewees noted was “less inte-
resting work” (29% of all respondents mentioned this, see Table 2), 
followed by “less security” (24%), “reduction in pay” (23%), 
and finally “shorter working hours” (14%). Men in the “East” 
and “West” shared the fact that they more frequently reported 
a deterioration in their work-related status than women did. 
Table 2. Perceptions of the crisis
Percentage of those having…
 “East” “West
Men Women Total Men Women Total
Less interesting work 33.7 27.8 30.7 30.8 25.1 28.1
Reduction in pay 26.1 22.6 24.3 23.4 19.8 21.7
Shorter hours 16.3 13.7 15.0 13.5 14.3 13.9
Less security 27.3 23.5 25.4 23.9 21.8 22.2
Source: ESS, 2010.
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The difference was about six percentage points between women 
and men: see, for example, the tables below on less interesting 
work.) Contrary to our expectations, slightly more Eastern than 
Western men (and women) complained of less interesting work. 
Every third man in the CEE countries noted that he had a less inte-
resting job in the years of crisis. 
The same tendency is observed in all the other cases: 
complaints about shorter working hours, reduction in pay and job 
security were more often emphasized by “Eastern” than “Western” 
men, and more often by men than women in general. Looked at 
from another angle, women complained less about bearing the 
employment-related burdens of the crisis. 
The fact of (involuntary) shortened working hours was the 
softest issue among the above listed items, and here we can see that 
women in the core countries were relatively more often affected by 
this measure (Table 2, row 3). We also have to note that it was the 
least frequent complaint. We should not forget either that the CEE 
countries have hardly any part-time or flextime options in their 
employment systems. All this comparative data underlines the 
previous thesis regarding the economic and social losses of 
the crisis. Both the “objective” statistics and the “subjective” 
perceptions the same phenomena: first, men faced more serious 
labor market losses than women did in the period 2007-2010, and 
second, women in “Eastern” countries have been more vulnerable 
to the last crisis than their “Western” peers. 
8. Conclusion
In the preceding analysis we have argued that comparing 
Central and East European countries to developed core industries is 
particularly useful to identify the gendered effects of the last 
economic crisis. As a starting point, we stated that many CEE coun-
tries still had not recovered from the transformation shock of the 
1990s, when the present crisis started. We showed that although a 
levelling down process was clear in Eastern Europe as well, men’s 
worsening social and economic situation was paralleled by 
women’s deteriorating position. We thus conclude that the crisis 
has led to a situation in which “an ebbing tide strands all boats”.  
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We pointed to the increasing inequality between women in 
core and peripheral societies, and the somewhat decreasing 
inequality between East European women and East European men, 
in terms of employment, poverty and material deprivation, though 
at a lower level than previously existed. This shift was reflected in 
the perceived effects of the present crisis, too. Whereas “Western” 
women were hit more intensely by the austerity measures, and 
were not affected immediately by the first wave of the economic 
crisis, women on peripheries underwent a permanent employment 
crisis until 2011 (CEE countries), or even longer (“Southern” peri-
phery). It is a special situation, which has not been elaborated in 
detail by previous analyses.
We have argued that the “silver lining” of job segregation has 
protected women in economic downturns in CEE countries, as it 
has in “Western” countries, and perhaps even more so. Still, job 
segregation does not explain all the variation among CEE coun-
tries: the Baltic States, which have a rather small population and 
strong gender segregation, have been particularly open to both 
economic boom and recession. Here, men have suffered huge 
losses, so it was a real “mancession”, but the recovery was faster for 
them, too. Slovakia, with a similarly high level of gender segrega-
tion, has had a different pattern, and less protection for women. 
Thus, the structure of economies and the functioning of welfare 
states might also explain the differences in national outcomes. 
Further investigations are needed, however, to explore the 
effect of austerity measures on gender relations in the labor 
markets of core and (semi-)peripheral countries. 
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Appendix   
Table 1. Employment rates (women and men aged 20-64) 
in EU member states – 2005 and 2010
Women Men Gender gap
2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010
EU-27 60 62.1 76 75.1 -16 -13
Belgium 58.6 61.6 74.3 73.5 -15.7 -11.9
Bulgaria 57.1 61.7 66.8 69.1 -9.7 -7.4
Czech Republic 61.3 60.9 80.1 79.6 -18.8 -18.7
Denmark 73.7 73.1 82.3 79 -8.6 -5.9
Germany 63.1 69.6 75.6 80.1 -12.5 -10.5
Estonia 69 65.7 75.4 67.7 -6.4 -2
Ireland 62.4 60.4 82.8 69.4 -20.4 -9
Greece 49.6 51.7 79.8 76.2 -30.2 -24.5
Spain 54.4 55.8 79.9 69.1 -25.5 -13.3
France 63.7 64.7 75.3 73.7 -11.6 -9
Italy 48.4 49.5 74.8 72.8 -26.4 -23.3
Cyprus 63.8 68.5 85.5 82.5 -21.7 -14
Latvia 65.7 64.9 75.4 65.1 -9.7 -0.2
Lithuania 66.6 65.1 74.9 63.6 -8.3 1.5
Luxembourg 58.4 62 79.4 79.2 -21 -17.2
Hungary 55.6 55 69.2 66 -13.6 -11
Malta 35.1 41.6 80.6 77.8 -45.5 -36.2
Netherlands 67.6 70.8 82.4 82.8 -14.8 -12
Austria 64.9 69.6 78.5 80.2 -13.6 -10.6
Poland 51.7 57.7 65.1 71.6 -13.4 -13.9
Portugal 66 65.6 78.7 75.4 -12.7 -9.8
Romania 56.9 55.9 70.4 70.8 -13.5 -14.9
Slovenia 66.2 66.5 75.8 74 -9.6 -7.5
Slovakia 56.7 57.4 72.5 71.9 -15.8 -14.5
Finland 70.8 71.5 75.1 74.5 -4.3 -3
Sweden 75.5 75.7 80.7 81.7 -5.2 -6
United Kingdom 68.5 67.9 82 79.3 -13.5 -11.4
Source: EC, 2012: 31.
An ebbing tide lowers all boats 149
Table 2. Share of part-time workers in total employment 
(persons aged 15 and over) in EU member states – 2005 and 2010
Women Men
2005 2010 2005 2010
EU-27 30.9 31.9 7.4 8.7
Belgium 40.5 42.3 7.6 9.0
Czech Republic 8.6 9.9 2.1 2.9
Denmark 33.0 39.0 12.7 15.2
Germany 43.8 45.5 7.8 9.7
Estonia 10.6 14.5 4.9 7.1
Ireland 31.8 34.7 6.4 11.8
Greece 9.3 10.4 2.3 3.7
Spain 24.2 23.2 4.5 5.4
France 30.3 30.1 5.8 6.7
Italy 25.6 29.0 4.6 5.5
Cyprus 14.0 12.7 5.0 6.5
Latvia 10.4 11.4 6.3 7.8
Lithuania 9.1 9.3 5.1 6.7
Luxembourg 38.2 36.0 2.5 4.0
Hungary 5.8 8.0 2.7 3.9
Malta 21.1 25.0 4.5 6.0
Netherlands 75.1 76.5 22.6 25.4
Austria 39.3 43.8 6.1 9.0
Poland 14.3 11.5 8.0 5.7
Portugal 16.2 15.5 7.0 8.2
Romania 10.5 11.4 10.0 10.6
Slovenia 11.1 14.7 7.2 8.6
Slovakia 4.1 5.4 1.3 2.8
Finland 18.6 19.6 9.2 10.0
Sweden 39.6 40.4 11.5 14.0
United Kingdom 42.6 43.3 10.4 12.6
Source: EC, 2012: 35.
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Table 3. Employment rates of men and women aged 25-49, 
depending on whether they have children (under 12) – 2010
Women Men
Without
children
With 
children
Gap Without
children
With 
children
Gap
EU-27 76.8 64.7 -12.1 81.0 89.7 8.7
Belgium 78.5 72.4 -6.1 83.0 91.4 8.4
Bulgaria 77.5 64.8 -12.6 76.7 83.0 6.3
Czech Republic 86.0 54.4 -31.6 88.6 95.5 6.9
Germany 83.8 64.5 -19.3 85.0 91.7 6.7
Estonia 81.9 62.6 -19.2 73.5 82.4 8.9
Ireland 76.0 57.2 -18.8 71.2 80.0 8.8
Greece 66.1 58.2 -7.8 82.1 93.0 11.0
Spain 68.1 60.1 -8.0 71.9 81.5 9.5
France 81.3 72.3 -9.0 83.7 91.7 8.0
Italy 62.7 54.7 -8.0 78.7 90.8 12.1
Cyprus 81.7 73.1 -8.6 85.2 93.9 8.7
Latvia 77.9 69.6 -8.4 69.6 81.0 11.3
Lithuania 78.2 74.9 -3.2 67.1 80.2 13.1
Luxembourg 78.8 69.4 -9.4 90.6 95.6 5.0
Hungary 78.2 49.3 -28.8 77.1 84.5 7.5
Malta 59.4 42.6 -16.7 86.4 94.9 8.5
Netherlands 82.8 78.2 -4.6 88.2 94.1 5.9
Austria 85.5 72.8 -12.7 87.6 92.7 5.1
Poland 78.6 66.8 -11.8 79.5 91.8 12.3
Portugal 76.5 74.6 -1.9 79.8 91.2 11.5
Romania 70.8 66.3 -4.5 80.0 86.5 6.5
Slovenia 83.0 84.9 1.9 81.9 94.1 12.2
Slovakia 80.4 53.7 -26.7 78.4 89.4 11.0
Finland 84.1 71.4 -12.7 80.6 92.4 11.8
United Kingdom 81.9 65.6 -16.3 83.0 90.5 7.5
Source: EC, 2012: 37.
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Table 4. Gender segregation in occupations and in economic sectors 
in EU member states – 2010
Gender segregation 
in occupations
Gender segregation 
in economic sectors
Belgium 25.4 19.5
Bulgaria 29.0 21.2
Czech Republic 28.3 20.9
Denmark 25.8 19.6
Germany 26.0 19.3
Estonia 30.7 25.7
Ireland 26.3 21.4
Greece 21.8 16.0
Spain 26.7 20.6
France 26.0 19.1
Italy 24.7 19.7
Cyprus 28.8 19.9
Latvia 28.2 24.5
Lithuania 28.8 21.9
Luxembourg 23.4 16.0
Hungary 27.8 20.9
Malta 23.7 16.0
Netherlands 25.0 19.4
Austria 25.9 19.3
Poland 26.1 20.6
Portugal 26.5 21.4
Romania 22.5 17.1
Slovenia 25.8 19.0
Slovakia 31.1 25.2
Finland 28.6 23.7
Sweden 26.1 21.6
United Kingdom 24.3 19.4
Source: EC, 2012: 38.
